It is good to remember history, and to remember that over time, history becomes re-interpreted. In light of this, a rather amazing report that the White House is thinking of letting the Taliban gain control over Afghanistan (again):
President Obama’s national security team is moving to reframe its war strategy by emphasizing the campaign against Al Qaeda in Pakistan while arguing that the Taliban in Afghanistan do not pose a direct threat to the United States, officials said Wednesday.
As Mr. Obama met with advisers for three hours to discuss Pakistan, the White House said he had not decided whether to approve a proposed troop buildup in Afghanistan. But the shift in thinking, outlined by senior administration officials on Wednesday, suggests that the president has been presented with an approach that would not require all of the additional troops that his commanding general in the region has requested.
It remains unclear whether everyone in Mr. Obama’s war cabinet fully accepts this view. While Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has argued for months against increasing troops in Afghanistan because Pakistan was the greater priority, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have both warned that the Taliban remain linked to Al Qaeda and would give their fighters havens again if the Taliban regained control of all or large parts of Afghanistan, making it a mistake to think of them as separate problems.
At this point it is important to remember the main reason why the U.S. went into Afghanistan in 2001. They believed that the Taliban — fairly much the same Taliban as now — gave a safe haven for al Qaeda to plan and execute 9/11. The Taliban were considered a direct threat to the U.S. The U.S. destroyed the Taliban’s government and installed Karzai (or, at least, provided favorable conditions for Karzai to become Head of State). In 2001, the dominant view was that the Taliban and al Qaeda are linked and mutually reinforcing. Now, in 2009, some of Obama’s advisors are saying that the link is not as strong, and that the Taliban is not a direct threat to the U.S. They argue that the focus should be on Pakistan which was, in part, a safe haven for al Qaeda, operationally speaking, and is becoming more so now. Some even refer to the Taliban as an “indigenous” group, an unsubstantiated claim considering that it was Pakistan who created, trained, and funded the Taliban in Afghanistan. They argue that at any rate, the Taliban are ingrained into Afghanistan, even though they’ve only been around since 1990. They claim that the Taliban would not want to bring al Qaeda back with them because it was al Qaeda what got them kicked out of the country before. They claim that surviving Afghan warlords like Hekmatyar are not jihadists, are not anti-American, but rather just want to control Afghanistan (and, likely their opium production). This is a radical reinterpretation of history that has radical consequences for the Middle East.
Continue reading “White House Re-Thinking Afghanistan War Strategy, Re-interpreting History” →